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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ELLIOTI GUTITMANN*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews cases involving the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments,
and evaluates decisions applicable to the right to a speedy trial, the right to trial
by jury, and sentencing.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has handed down several
significant decisions regarding the fourth amendment. 2 In New Mexico, the courts
have tended to affirm or clarify existing case law rather than to establish a new
direction or precedent. One result has been a paucity of cases containing significant fourth amendment issues before the New Mexico courts during the survey
year.
A. Third Party Consent
One area where the courts provided assistance and clarification was third party
consent. In State v. Clark,3 the defendant's landlady gave consent for the police
to search the defendant's premises and possessions.4 Such consent would normally be insufficient to allow a search because of a person's expectation of
privacy in his premises and possessions,' but the state also relied upon the theory
of abandonment6 to validate the search. If a person does not demonstrate a
privacy expectation when he has abandoned his premises, he will not be protected
by the fourth amendment against a warrantless search. 7 The court, after an
extensive discussion of what factors constitute abandonment, found that the
*Assistant District Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
I. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
3. 105 N.M. 10, 727 P.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1986).
4. Id. at 12, 727 P.2d at 951.
5. id. See Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967); State v.
Donaldson, 100 N.M. I I, 666 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App. 1983).
6. Clark, 105 N.M. 12-13, 727 P.2d at 951-52.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 13-14, 727 P.2d at 952-53. Evidence offered by the state in support of abandonment included
the fact that the landlady had heard that defendant was in jail, that defendant was behind in his rent, and
that the landlady had made arrangements with defendant's sister to remove defendant's possessions. Id.

The court noted that mere nonpayment of rent was not, in itself, evidence of abandonment nor was the
fact of defendant's incarceration. Id. The court relied on the evidence that defendant had communicated

to his sister his desire for the removal of his possessions. Id.
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defendant had abandoned his premises and possessions and, therefore, did not
qualify for the protections of the fourth amendment.9
In State v. Hensel,' also involving third party consent, the defendant's mother
was the personal representative of an estate where a ranch was located." She
told police that her son had stolen her car, that the car probably was at the ranch
and that her son probably would have left drugs at the ranch; the son was later
to testify that his mother had given him the ranch and that he lived there on a
sporadic basis.' 2 Although the mother never lived at the ranch or used it in any
way, she gave consent for a warrantless search of the ranch.' 3 While searching
the ranch, the police found illegal drugs.' 4
The trial court held that the mother was the owner of the ranch and, therefore,
had authority to give consent.'" The court of appeals disagreed; it held that more
than mere ownership is required for third party consent.' 6 The authority which
justifies third party consent does not rest upon the law of property; rather,
authority to consent rests on the mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control of the property."' Although the court of appeals
was primarily concerned with another issue, the right of confrontation, nevertheless it ordered a new hearing on the issue of third party consent to determine
the lawfulness of defendant's occupancy of the ranch and his mother's authority
to consent to a warrantless search of the ranch property. 8
State v. Hensel, like State v. Clark, helps clarify third party consent in New
Mexico. In both cases a third party owner gave consent to search premises
occupied by another. In Hensel, where the mother gave consent to search the
ranch, ownership alone was not sufficient for a valid search. In Clark, however,
the court made an exception where abandonment of the premises was shown.'
The cases represent a fine tuning of the definitions of ownership and abandonment
in the context of third party consent by an owner.
'"

B. Search Warrant Affidavits
The United States Supreme Court has noted that a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule may exist.2' The New Mexico Court of Appeals briefly discussed, but did not apply, the good faith exception in State v. Crenshaw.22 The
police officers in Crenshaw had gone on foot patrol in the Lincoln National
Forest in search of marijuana.23 They believed, incorrectly, that they were on
9. Id. at 14, 727 P.2d at 953.
10. 106 N.M. 8, 738 P.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1987).
1I. id. at 9, 738 P.2d at 127.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8, 738 P.2d at 126.
15. Id. at 9, 738 P.2d at 127.
16. Id. at 10, 738 P.2d at 128.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 11, 738 P.2d at 129.
19. td. at 10, 738 P.2d at 128.
20. Clark, 105 N.M. at 14, 727 P.2d at 953.
21. See supra note 2.
22. 105 N.M. 329, 732 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1986).

23. Id. at 330, 732 P.2d at 432.
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national forest land when they discovered defendant's cabin and numerous marijuana plants; they were, in fact, on defendant's property.24 They obtained a search
warrant based upon their observations.'
Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. 26
He argued on appeal that the initial search that formed the basis for probable
cause to issue the warrant was illegal because the officers had intruded onto the
curtilage of the cabin that defendant had leased.27
The State asked the court of appeals to uphold the trial court's admission of
the evidence obtained in the search under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.2" The United States Supreme Court leaves to the state courts'
discretion whether to resolve a fourth amendment question before turning to the
good faith issue or whether to consider immediately the issue of the officers'
good faith. 29 The court chose to examine the fourth amendment violation first,
and found that the search warrant was invalid based on the pre-warrant trespass
onto defendant's curtilage. 3° It held that much of the evidence seized was inadmissible and remanded the case for a new trial. 3
The court of appeals was reluctant to apply a good faith exception under the
facts of this case. It feared that using the officers' good faith to overcome the
initial trespass would serve to eliminate the exclusionary rule, which the court
declined to do.3 2 The court did not exclude the good faith exception in all cases,
but in requiring an examination of the fourth amendment violation first, the court
created a hurdle for those seeking its application.
The New Mexico courts will continue to evaluate search warrant affidavits
and, if possible, to save warrants by excising those portions of them which
contain material misrepresentations or tainted evidence. In State v. Copeland33
and State v. Doran, 4 the court of appeals noted that when a search warrant is
based partially on tainted evidence and partially on evidence obtained from
independent sources, evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is sometimes admissible. Such evidence is admissible if the lawfully obtained information amounts
to probable cause and if it would justify issuance of the warrant apart from the
tainted information. 35 In these and similar cases in the future, the courts must
still make the difficult judgment as to whether the remaining facts of the warrant
are sufficient to save the warrant. This determination will have to be made on
a case-by-case basis. In both Copeland and Doran, the court of appeals upheld
the admission of non-tainted or independent evidence. 36
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 331, 732 P.2d at 433.
Id.
Id. at 334, 732 P.2d at 436.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 335, 732 P.2d at 437.
Id. at 334, 732 P.2d at 436.
Id. at 335, 732 P.2d at 437.
Id. at 334, 732 P.2d at 436.
105 N.M. 27, 727 P.2d 1342 (Ct. App. 1986).
105 N.M. 300, 731 P.2d 1344 (Ct. App. 1986).
Copeland, 105 N.M. at 32, 727 P.2d at 1347; Doran, 105 N.M. at 303, 731 P.2d at 1347.
Copeland, 105 N.M. at 33, 727 P.2d at 1348; Doran, 105 N.M. at 303-04, 731 P.2d at 1347-48.
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C. WarrantlessArrest-Exigent Circumstances
If probable cause exists, exigent circumstances provide an exception to the
rule requiring a warrant to arrest a person.37 In State v. Copeland, officers went
to a motel room following a hit-and-run accident and saw the defendant, a suspect
in the accident, through a crack in the door.38 The officers knew or believed that
hit-and-run accidents usually are associated with driving while intoxicated (DWI)
and were fearful that the evidence (alcohol in defendant's bloodstream) would
dissipate.39 The officers also believed that a search warrant would take approximately three hours to procure." Therefore, the officers broke the chainlock,
entered the room, arrested the defendant, and gave him breath alcohol tests.4'
The court upheld the warrantless arrest, noting that the alcohol in defendant's
system was metabolizing as time passed and, therefore, the evidence would have
been destroyed had a warrant been required.42
D. Right to Frisk
The court of appeals adopted a standard for deciding what circumstances justify
a frisk by police officers in State v. Cobbs.43 A police officer had received a
dispatch to investigate a possible residential burglary in progress." Once there,
the officer apprehended the defendant and without asking any questions patted
him down and found a syringe.4" The trial court apparently disapproved of the
officer's failure to question the defendant prior to the patdown and suppressed
the evidence.'
The court of appeals reversed and upheld the validity of the search even though
the officer had not made an inquiry prior to the patdown search. 47 More importantly, the court of appeals adopted a standard for determining an officer's right
to frisk or conduct a protective search: that right is automatic whenever the
suspect has been stopped upon the suspicion that he has committed, was committing, or was about to commit a type of crime for which an offender is likely
to be armed." Under the Cobbs standard, a frisk or patdown search of a burglary
suspect is permissible even though the suspect does not behave in a threatening
37. Copeland, 105 N.M. at 31, 727 P.2d at 1346; see State v. Chavez, 98 N.M. 61, 644 P.2d 1050

(Ct. App. 1982).
38. Copeland, 105 N.M. at 29-30, 727 P.2d at 1344-45.
39. Id. at 30, 727 P.2d at 1345.
40. id.
41. Id. The accident occurred about two and one-half hours prior to the police officers' entering the
room. The defendant was taken to the police station and given three breath alcohol tests. They registered
.19, .21, and .21.
42. Copeland, 105 N.M. at 31-32, 727 P.2d at 1346-47.
43. 103 N.M. 623, 711 P.2d 900 (Ct. App. 1985).
44. Id. at 625, 711 P.2d at 902.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 627, 711 P.2d at 902.
47. id. at 627-28, 711 P.2d at 904-05. The court cited Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 33 (1968): "there is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a

person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer
might be a bullet."
48. Cobbs, 103 N.M. at 630, 711 P.2d at 907.
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manner. 49 Other inherently dangerous crimes to which the Cobbs standard will
apply include robbery, rape, assault with weapons, and dealing in large narcotics
transactions. 50
HI. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

51

A. Miranda Warnings
The Miranda52 decision, twenty years later, continues to be one of the most
contested and debated decisions in criminal procedure. In State v. Greyeyes,53
the court of appeals analyzed the Miranda warnings in the context of a routine
traffic stop.' A police officer arrived at the scene of an accident and began
general on-the-scene questioning. 5 The defendant, in response to the officer's
questions, said he had been drinking all night.' These admissions were used
against the defendant to obtain a driving while intoxicated conviction. 7
On appeal, defendant argued that his statements should not have been admitted
at trial because he was not given the Miranda warnings before questioning
began. 58 The court of appeals noted that the right to Miranda warnings does not
attach until an accused is in custody or is deprived of freedom in some significant
way. 9 The court upheld the driving while intoxicated conviction and held that
general on-the-scene questioning in the fact-finding process is not custodial and
does not deprive the defendant of freedom in a significant way.6 The fact that
the police may have focused their investigation on the defendant, as happened
here, does not necessarily raise the questioning to a level requiring Miranda
warnings."
In State v. Tindle,6 2 the court of appeals provided guidance as to the type of
49. id. Defendant relied heavily upon the ruling of the court of appeals in State v. Harison, 95 N.M.
383, 622 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1980). The court of appeals in Cobbs held that to the extent that Harrison
requires that an officer must not only have reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed but also reasonable
suspicion that a suspect is presently dangerous, it is not to be followed.
50. Cobbs, 103 N.M. at 630, 711 P.2d at 907.
51. The fifth amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53. 105 N.M. 549, 734 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1987).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 550, 734 P.2d at 790.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 551, 734 P.2d at 791.
59. Id. See State v. Swise, 100 N.M. 256, 669 P.2d 732 (1983).
60. Greyeyes, 105 N.M. at 551, 734 P.2d at 791.
61. Id. See State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968); State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 620
P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162
(1982).
62. 104 N.M. 195, 718 P.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1986).
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63
promises that would render a confession admissible or inadmissible. In Tindle
a police officer gave the defendant Miranda warnings while arresting him and
made an implied promise that "it would be better" if the defendant confessed.64
65
The trial court suppressed the defendant's confession and the State appealed.
The appellate court distinguished between express promises and implied promises.' An express promise of leniency will render a confession involuntary as a
matter of law. 67An implied promise of leniency, on the other hand, is but one
factor among many that the court must consider when it evaluates the totality
6
of circumstances surrounding a confession. " In Tindle, the court of appeals felt
that the trial court might have erroneously applied the standard for an express
69
promise to the officer's implied promise. The case was remanded to the trial
7
court to ensure that its decision comported with the appellate court's analysis. '

B. Comment on Failure to Testify
7
A prosecutor's comments in State v. Lopez were grounds for the court of
72
appeals to order a new trial. At the close of defendant's case, the trial court
inquired whether the state intended to present rebuttal testimony." The defendant
initially intended to testify, but decided not to do so." The prosecutor, in the
presence and hearing of the jury, responded, "Yes sir, . . . having been told
that . . .Mr. Colson was going to take the stand . . . it's going to take me
about ....""The court of appeals found that the prosecutor's comments violated
the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and that the
comments constituted reversible error.76 The fact that the prosecutor might have
made a mistake or might have made his comments inadvertently did not lessen
the prejudicial impact of the comments.77
The rule prohibiting comment on a defendant's failure to testify or his silence
at time of arrest applies with equal force to a defendant's refusal to consent to
a search. 7" In Garcia v. State,79 the defendant refused to allow police officers to
63. Id.
64. Id. at 198, 718 P.2d at 708.
65. id. at 196, 718 P.2d at 706.
66. Id. at 199, 718 P.2d at 709.
State v. Wickman, 39 N.M. 198,
67. Id. See State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952);
43 P.2d 933 (1935).
68. Tindle, 104 N.M. at 199-200, 718 P.2d at 709-10.
69. id. at 200, 718 P.2d at 710.
70. id.
71. 105 N.M. 538, 734 P.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1986).
72. Id. at 548, 734 P.2d at 788.
73. Id. at 544, 734 P.2d at 784.
74. Id. at 545, 734 P.2d at 785.
75. Id. at 544, 744 P.2d at 784.
76. Id. at 545, 744 P.2d at 785.
77. Id. The court cited State v. Frank, 92 N.M. 456, 589 P.2d 1047 (1979), which stated that "whatever
the prosecutor's intentions might have been and even if spoken with the purest of motives, if in fact the
comments related to the failure of the defendant to testify, they were prejudicial and required that the
conviction be set aside." See Gonzales v. State, 94 N.M. 495, 612 P.2d 1306 (1980); State v. Dominguez,
91 N.M. 296, 573 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1977).
78. Garcia v. State, 103 N.M. 713, 712 P.2d 1375 (1986).
79. Id.at 714, 712 P.2d at 1376.
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search his car. At trial, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's refusal to
consent to the search."9 The court of appeals upheld the conviction despite the
prosecutor's comments, but the supreme court reversed. 8' A defendant has a
right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search without such refusal later being
used to imply his guilt.8 2 This right, the supreme court noted, is analogous to
the right to remain silent; refusal to permit a search is as ambiguous as invoking
silence. 3
C. Double Jeopardy
Defendants made numerous challenges on the basis of double jeopardy, but
their convictions were upheld. In State v. Price," the defendant was found guilty
of attempted felony murder.8 " The court of appeals ruled that attempted felony
murder was a non-existent crime, reversed defendant's conviction on that charge
and remanded the case for a new trial." Defendant asked the court to preclude
the state, on remand, from charging him with attempt to commit first degree
murder, 7 claiming that jeopardy attached because he had already gone to trial
and been convicted.' The court of appeals, however, reasoned that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction in the first trial since attempted felony murder is a non-existent
charge. 9 The court concluded that if the trial court did not have jurisdiction
there was no prior conviction so there could be no basis for a claim of double
jeopardy.9'
In State v. Williams,9' the State obtained multiple convictions of criminal sexual
contact on the theory that defendant committed one offense by touching the
victim's breast, and another by touching her genital area.92 The defendant claimed
double jeopardy.93 On appeal, however, the court of appeals found that the
legislature intended to protect the victim from intrusions to each enumerated
94
area.

The defendant also claimed that double jeopardy applied because he had been
convicted of similar crimes: kidnapping by holding for service and assault with
intent to commit criminal sexual penetration. 95 The appellate court defined and
distinguished the two crimes. According to the court, "to hold for services"
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 713-14, 712 P.2d at 1375-76.
Id. at 714, 712 P.2d at 1376.
Id.
104 N.M. 703, 726 P.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 706, 726 P.2d at 860.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 707, 726 P.2d at 861.
Id. at 706, 726 P.2d at 860.
Id.
Id.

91. 105 N.M. 214, 730 P.2d 1196 (Ct. App. 1986).
92. Id. at 216, 730 P.2d at 1198. N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-9-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1984): "Criminal sexual

contact is intentionally touching or applying force without consent to the unclothed intimate parts of another
who has reached his eighteenth birthday... for purposes of this section 'intimate parts' means the primary

genital area, groin, buttocks, anus or breast."
93. Williams, 105 N.M. at 216, 730 P.2d at 1198.
94. Id. at 217, 730 P.2d at 1199.
95. Id. at 216, 730 P.2d at 1198.
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includes sexual purposes which can be either criminal sexual penetration or
criminal sexual contact.9 In contrast, the crime of assault with intent to commit
criminal sexual penetration is specifically defined only in terms of criminal sexual
penetration.9" At trial, in addition to evidence of a sexual assault, there was
evidence from which the jury could infer that defendant restrained the victim
with the intent of holding her for services, i.e., noncriminal sexual penetration
purposes."
The appellate court held that because different evidence underlay the two
offenses of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual penetration and kidnapping by holding for service, no merger was required and no double jeopardy°
attached.' The court of appeals reached the same conclusion in State v. Hernandez"
where it held that the defendant's conviction for trafficking and for conspiracy
did not violate double jeopardy because these are separate offenses with separate
evidentiary requirements.'°0
In State v. Ross," the defendant was convicted of six counts of fraud and six
counts of fraudulent securities practices. "3 He claimed that conviction for both
offenses placed him in double jeopardy and subjected him to double punishment."'0 The court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention and held that
the elements of general fraud are not necessarily involved in a charge of fraudulent
securities practices. 05
06
The issue of sentencing and double jeopardy was addressed in07State v. Rushing.'
The trial court orally gave the defendant a deferred sentence. Before the court
entered a written judgment and sentence, the state filed a motion to reconsider
8
the sentence based upon the defendant's misrepresentations at sentencing.' The
sentence
imposed
defendant argued that he had commenced serving his orally
however,
and that the trial court could not increase his sentence. 9The trial court,
0
granted the state's motion and gave a new sentence (incarceration). " The court
upon which the
of appeals upheld the new sentence, reasoning that the actions
"
under
Moreover,
'
finality.
of
defendant relied created no reasonable expectation
preclude
not
would
principles
jeopardy
double
case,
this
to
the facts peculiar
vacating a deferred sentence that was obtained2 on the basis of the defendant's
misrepresentations at the time of sentencing."
96. id. at 218, 730 P.2d at 1200.

97. Id.
98. Id.

99. id.
100. 104 N.M. 268, 720 P.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1986).
101. Id. at 278, 720 P.2d at 313.
102. 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1986).

103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 24, 715 P.2d at 472.
Id. at 27, 715 P.2d at 475.
103 N.M. 333, 706 P.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 334, 706 P.2d at 876.

108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 335, 706 P.2d at 877.
Id.
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IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT" 3
A. Right to Counsel
Many cases appearing before the court in New Mexico came under the ambit
of the sixth amendment. The court of appeals addressed the right to counsel in
State v. Hamilton,"4 where the defendant was advised of his right to counsel
and to have counsel appointed if he were indigent.' Defendant initially said he
would retain private counsel."' 6 At the preliminary hearing a month later, however, he informed the court that he could not afford counsel." 7 The trial court
concluded that, by waiting to inform the court until the time of hearing, the
defendant had waived his right to appointed counsel."' The court of appeals
reversed," 9 holding that the trial court ignored the well-established principle that
an accused is not required to request the assistance of counsel; 20 counsel must
be provided whether or not the accused requests one.121
In State v. Seward, 22 the defendant was charged with an offense and was
represented by a public defender with respect to that offense. While the defendant
was in custody for that offense, the police questioned him on an unrelated
offense. 23
' The court of appeals held that statements the defendant made under
this questioning were voluntary; using them against the defendant
did not violate
24
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The court also analyzed defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. At
issue was whether defendant's statement should have been suppressed because
25
the police failed to notify the public defender that defendant was in custody.
Defendant argued that the statement was obtained in violation of the Public
Defender Act 26 and the Indigent Defense Act 2 and that the public defender
should have been consulted prior to the statement.' 2' The court of appeals held
that neither act was applicable: (1) no right to counsel was triggered by the
113. The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
114. 104 N.M. 614, 725 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1986).
115. Id. at 615, 725 P.2d at 591.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 616, 725 P.2d at 592.
119. Id.
120. Id. See Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
121. Hamilton, 104 N.M. at 616, 725 P.2d at 592. The case was remanded to the trial court with
instructions to vacate the sentence and to provide a new preliminary hearing. Id. at 619, 725 P.2d at 595.
122. 104 N.M. 548, 724 P.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1986).
123. Id. at 553, 724 P.2d at 761.
124. Id. at 554, 724 P.2d at 762.
125. Id. at 552, 724 P.2d at 760.
126. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§31-15-1 to -12 (Rep]. Pamp. 1984). Readers should note that statutes are
now codified in (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
127. Id. §§31-16-1 to -10.
128. Seward, 104 N.M. at 552, 724 P.2d at 760.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Indigent Defense Act until defendant's first court appearance on a particular
charge, and (2) the Public Defender Act did not confer blanket authorization for
the public defender to meet with all indigents in custody.' 29Thus, a defendant
in custody can be questioned on unrelated charges without violating the sixth
amendment right to counsel. " To bolster this conclusion, the court of appeals
cited the U.S. Supreme Court which had recently said: "To exclude evidence
pertaining to charges as to which the sixth amendment right to counsel had not
attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other charges
were pending at the time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in
the investigation of criminal activities. '' 31
B. Right to Pro Se Representation
New Mexico courts continued to struggle with the question of when a defendant
has properly asserted his right to represent himself or to request substitution of
counsel. In State v. Lewis, 132 the defendant vacillated about whether he wanted
to represent himself. The trial court assigned a court-appointed attorney; 133 on
appeal, the defendant argued that he had been denied the right to represent
himself."3 The court of appeals held that the defendant's indecision could be
considered a waiver of his right to self-representation. 131
A defendant's request to represent himself was also made in State v. Chapman. 136 The trial court denied the request to appear pro se. 1 37 On appeal, the

defendant argued that the denial was error because the court failed to make an
inquiry into his abilities to make a valid waiver of counsel.' 38 The court of
appeals held that the denial was not error because the trial court had presided
over a lengthy competency hearing and had sufficient information with which
to make a proper determination of the defendant's abilities to waive counsel.' 39
C. Right to Substitution of Counsel
Related to the issue of the right to appear pro se is the right of an indigent to
substitute counsel. A defendant does not have the right to dismiss arbitrarily a
court-appointed counsel and request another counsel. In State v. Lewis, " the
court of appeals held that the decision to appoint substitute counsel is discretionary; the court will not grant substitute counsel without a showing of good
cause. '' The court reached a similar conclusion in State v. Hernandez,42
' where
129. Id.at 553, 724 P.2d at 761. See State v. Rascon, 89 N.M. 254, 550 P.2d 266 (1976).
130. Seward, 104 N.M. at 554, 724 P.2d at 762. See United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217 (2nd Cir.
1973) (questioning violated neither sixth amendment nor professional ethics).
131. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
132. 104 N.M. 677, 726 P.2d 354 (Ct.App. 1986).
133. /d.at 677-78, 726 P.2d at 354-55.
134. td. at 682, 726 P.2d at 359.
135. Id.
136. 104 N.M. 324, 721 P.2d 392 (1986).
137. Id. at 327, 721 P.2d at 395.
138. /d.
139. td. His conviction was reversed on other grounds.
140. 104 N.M. at 680, 726 P.2d at 357.
141. td.
142. 104 N.M. 268, 720 P.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1986).
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it said that it would not find abuse of discretion unless inadequate representation
or prejudice to the defendant was shown.' 43
The court provided guidelines for the substitution of counsel in State v. Lucero.'" In this instance defense counsel, more than the defendant, sought substitution of counsel. 45
' The court measures a request such as this by the sixth
amendment promise of effective assistance of counsel. "'4
The trial court correctly
found that defendant had not articulated a sound justification for replacement of
counsel.' 47 At the subsequent habitual offender proceeding, however, relations
between defendant and his counsel had become somewhat strained and the trial
court should have permitted withdrawal of counsel.'" Counsel, mindful that he
could have been held in contempt, informed the court he would not aid or
represent defendant. "' Counsel's statements should have alerted the court that
defendant probably would not receive the performance of a reasonably competent
defense attorney; because the trial court erred in refusing to appoint substitute
counsel at the habitual offender proceeding, the court of appeals reversed the
sentence and remanded for a new habitual offender hearing.'

D. Right to Confrontation
An important sixth amendment case involving the right of confrontation and
videotape testimony was later vacated by the United States Supreme Court.'
In State v. Tafoya, 2 videotaped depositions were taken of child abuse victims
while the defendant was required to remain in a control booth. The defendant
argued that the procedure violated not only his sixth amendment right to confront
witnesses against him but also a state statute and rule of criminal procedure
which required that depositions be taken in the presence of the defendant.'
The court of appeals reasoned that the general rule favoring face-to-face confrontation sometimes must give way to considerations of policy and necessity. "
There was testimony that each child would suffer harm if required to testify faceto-face with the defendant.' The court of appeals liberally defined the term
"presence"; the defendant was at hand, was within reach and, therefore, was
present. 6 In addition, the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 272, 720
104 N.M. 587,
Id. at 591, 725
Id. at 593, 725
id. at 592, 725
Id. at 594, 725
Id.

P.2d at 307; see State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977).
725 P.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1986).
P.2d at 270.
P.2d at 272.
P.2d at 271.
P.2d at 273.

Id.
151. In Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2810 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that confrontation
means face to face confrontation, and remanded because there was a screen between a child and defendant.
Tafoya v. New Mexico was also remanded for further action consistent with Coy v. Iowa.
152. 105 N.M. 117, 729 P.2d 1371 (Ct. App. 1986).
153. N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-9-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) and N.M. R. CRIM. P. 29.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
The statute and the rule required the deposition to be taken "in the presence of defendant" or require

defendant to be "present".
154. Tafoya, 105 N.M. at 120, 729 P.2d at 1374.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 119, 729 P.2d at 1373.
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victims.'57 The court of appeals had ruled that his sixth amendment right to
confront witnesses had been satisfied.'s
In State v. Hensel,5 9 the court of appeals discussed the right of confrontation
in the context of a suppression hearing."r Ordinarily, the Rules of Evidence are
inapplicable in suppression hearings.'' Hensel's suppression hearing, however,
involved not only a hearsay objection but also a sixth amendment confrontation
claim. 62
"' The police officer testified that defendant's mother, who did not testify,
had given permission to search property upon which the defendant was found
with illegal drugs. '63The court of appeals noted that while a defendant is not
guaranteed the right to confront all out-of-court declarants in any suppression
hearing, he does have the constitutional right to confront the key witnesses against
him. "6The mother's authority to consent to the search made her a key witness. 65
Defendant's conviction was reversed. "6The significance of this decision is that
a trial court must decide whether a witness is an important or key witness prior
to permitting the admission of hearsay evidence against the defendant in a
suppression hearing.
The court of appeals made a similar ruling regarding the right of confrontation
in State v. Austin. 67
' The facts in this two witness case are simple. The defendant
worked as a clerk for Western Union in Hobbs, New Mexico. "6sWhen a customer
asked to have money wired, defendant would record it in her daily log. 69 The
main Western Union office in Kansas City, also recording transactions on its
computer, discovered that the Hobbs office's bank balance was insufficient to
cover the amount of money wired from that office. 7o The New Mexico employer
made a comparison of defendant's daily logs with computer printouts from the
Kansas City office and discovered transactions recorded on the printouts which
were not on the defendant's logs. "' At trial the printouts were admitted under
the business records exception to the rule against hearsay.' 72 Based upon the
discrepancies between the daily logs and the printouts, defendant was convicted
of twenty-two counts of embezzlement. "'
The court of appeals noted that the admissibility of the printouts under the
157. Id. at 121, 729 P.2d at 1375.
158. Id. In Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that confrontation
means face to face confrontation, and remanded because there was a screen between a child and defendant.
Tafoya v. New Mexico was also remanded for further action consistent with Coy v. Iowa.
159. 106 N.M. 8, 738 P.2d 126.
160. Id. at 10, 738 P.2d at 128.
161. Id.
162. Id.

163. Id. at 9, 738 P.2d at 127.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 10-11, 738 P.2d at 128-29.
Id. at 10, 738 P.2d at 128.
Id. at II, 738 P.2d at 129.
104 N.M. 573, 725 P.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573-74, 725 P.2d at 252-53.
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business records exception was not the only issue to consider. 74 Generally, wellestablished hearsay exceptions are presumptively reliable. " 5 There are cases,
however, where the out-of-court declarant, i.e., records, is a witness against the
defendant, and while the evidence may be admissible under a hearsay exception,
it may still offend the confrontation clause. 76
'
Under the confrontation clause, the computer printouts should have been
excluded. 77
' The computerized records in this case differ in important ways from
traditional business records.' There were only two witnesses at trial, the defendant and the victim, the New Mexico employer, and neither witness understood how the computer printouts were prepared. "' Thus, although these printouts
were the primary basis for convicting the defendant, she had no opportunity to
cross-examine any witness concerning their accuracy. "8The court of appeals
found that the trial court erred in admitting the records.' 8 '
The court of appeals felt there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant if the computerized printouts were excluded.' 82 Therefore, the court
remanded the case with instructions to discharge the defendant.' 83
In two cases during the survey period New Mexico appellate courts emphasized
a defendant's right to be present at all stages of a criminal trial, a right which
also derives from the confrontation clause.' 84 In State v. McDuffie, 85
' defense
counsel participated in a suppression hearing after waiving presence of the defendant. 86
' The court of appeals held that because the defendant was not aware
of the waiver he could not have waived his presence voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. 87
The New Mexico Supreme Court made a similar ruling in Hovey v. State.'88
The supreme court rejected the claim that defense counsel orally waived the
defendant's right to be present during a communication between the court and
the attorney. 89
' The supreme court invalidated the waiver on the grounds that the
trial court could not properly infer that the defendant voluntarily had waived his
presence. 9" When counsel seeks a waiver, the trial court must exercise extra
caution and circumspection to ascertain whether counsel is waiving the right or
whether the defendant voluntarily was doing so through his attorney. 191
174.
175.
176.
177.

N.M. R. EVID. 803(6) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
Austin, 104 N.M. at 575, 725 P.2d at 254.
Id.
Id.

178. Id. at 576, 725 P.2d at 255.
179. Id.

180. Id.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Proffitt v. wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982).
106 N.M. 120, 739 P.2d 989 (Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 121, 739 P.2d at 990.
Id. at 122, 739 P.2d at 991.
104 N.M. 667, 726 P.2d 344 (1986).
Id. at 671, 726 P.2d at 348.
Id.
McDuffie, 106 N.M. at 122, 739 P.2d at 991.
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V. RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
A. Right to Speedy Trial
In State v. Kilpatrick,92
' the court of appeals ruled that the defendant had been
denied a right to a speedy trial. 93 The defendant was arrested, incarcerated
briefly, and released after posting bond. ' While on bond, the defendant remained
subject to certain obligations and restrictions. 95
' Eleven months passed between
the defendant's arrest and indictment. " The court of appeals initially rejected
defendant's claim of prejudicial delay.' 97 The supreme court reversed and remanded the cause to the court of appeals with instructions to determine whether
defendant had been prejudiced.' 9
The court of appeals then found that the delay of more than ten months was
presumptively prejudicial, thereby compelling review of additional balancing
factors."9 Based upon the review of factors and guidelines, the court of appeals
found that the defendant had been denied the right to a speedy trial. 2" The case
established that a delay of ten months or more could in some cases require a
finding of a presumption of prejudice.
In evaluating a defendant's claim of right to a speedy trial, the court will
consider whether the defendant is responsible for the delay. In State v. Tarango,20'
the defendant left prison on furlough and failed to return.2"2 The defendant was
subsequently arrested and incarcerated in another state.2"3 The defendant was
returned to New Mexico and convicted of escape. 2' The defendant argued on
appeal that he was denied his right to a speedy trial because he was not tried
until twenty-five months after the criminal complaint for escape had been filed
against him.2"5 The court of appeals noted that since the defendant had been a
fugitive and then imprisoned in another state, most of the delay was attributable
to him.' The court, affirming defendant's conviction, also held that the state
was not responsible for delay prior to the time it was notified of defendant's
whereabouts.2"7
192. 104 N.M. 441, 722 P.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1986).
193. Id. at 446, 722 P.2d at 697.
194. Id. at 443, 722 P.2d at 694.
195. Id. at 445-46, 722 P.2d at 696-97.
196. Id. at 443, 722 P.2d at 694.
197. Id. at 442, 722 P.2d at 693.
198. Id. at 442-43, 722 P.2d at 693-94.
199. ld. at 444, 722 P.2d at 695. Once a presumption of prejudice exists, the balancing factors established
in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) must be considered. These factors include: (I) length of delay;
(2) reasons for delay; (3) assertion of right; and (4) prejudice to defendant. See United States v. McDonald,
456 U.S. 1 (1982); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
200. Kilpatrick, 104 N.M. at 446, 722 P.2d at 697.
201. 105 N.M. 592, 734 P.2d 1275 (Ct. App. 1987).
202. Id. at 594, 734 P.2d at 1277.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 597, 734 P.2d at 1280.
206. Id. at 598, 734 P.2d at 1281.
207. Id.
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B. Right to Continuance
The defendant was convicted of burglary in March v. State.2t The supreme
court found, however, that the trial court's denial of defendant's request for a
continuance was an abuse of discretion. 2' One day prior to trial defense counsel
moved for a continuance in order to obtain a forensic evaluation to determine
whether the defendant had a viable defense of lack of capacity to form a specific
intent. 1 0 When it denied the motion, the trial court violated due process by
making a potential avenue of defense unavailable to the defendant. 2" '
In State v. Peterson,2" 2 the trial court also denied defendant's request for a
continuance, but this time the court of appeals affirmed.2"' The defendant, appearing pro se, requested a continuance to prepare for the trial. 2"4 The court of
appeals felt that the defendant had had ample time to prepare and that any lack
of preparedness was due to his own dilatoriness.2"5 The trial court had met its
dual responsibilities to provide for a fair trial and for an orderly and expeditious
proceeding of litigation.2"6
VI. TRIAL BY JURY
A. Jury Selection
In several cases the court illustrated the importance of jury selection. Specifically, in two cases, State v. Sandoval"7 and Fuson v. State,2t 8 the court overruled
previous decisions and granted new trials because the defendants were not given
a fair and impartial jury. In State v. Sandoval, a Hispanic defendant appealed
on grounds that the state improperly based its peremptory challenges on the race
of the prospective jurors. 2 9 The prosecutor excused the only two Hispanic jurors
who could have served on the jury, thus creating a Hispanic-free jury panel. 2"
Prior to Sandoval, a defendant seeking to show systematic exclusion of jurors
based upon race was required to demonstrate a pattern of exclusion that extended
beyond his own case.221 In 1986, the United States Supreme Court modified this
standard in Batson v. Kentucky.22 2 Under the Batson standard, a defendant can
223
establish a pattern of racial exclusion based solely on the facts of his case.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

105 N.M. 453, 734 P.2d 231 (1987).
id. at 454, 734 P.2d at 232.
Id. at 454-55, 734 P.2d at 232-33.
Id. at 456, 734 P.2d at 234.
103 N.M. 638, 711 P.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 643, 711 P.2d at 920.
Id. at 641, 711 P.2d at 918.
id. at 643, 711 P.2d at 920.
Id.
105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1987).
105 N.M. 632, 735 P.2d 1138 (1987).
105 N.M. at 697, 736 P.2d at 502.
Id.
Id. at 698, 736 P.2d at 503. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Sandoval, 105 N.M. at 698, 736 P.2d at 503.
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This standard makes it easier for a defendant to assert and prove prejudice since
prejudice will be reviewed as it applies on a case-by-case basis. In Sandoval,
New Mexico adopted the Batson standard, reversed the defendant's conviction,
and remanded the case for a new trial.224
During voir dire in Fuson v. State, a prospective juror voiced his uncertainty
about his ability to be a fair and impartial juror."2 The defendant sought to excuse
the person for cause; when the court denied the request, the defendant was forced
to use all of his peremptory challenges before the court completed the venire.226
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. In doing so, the court
relied on State v. Martinez, where the supreme court stated that it would only
find that a trial court's failure to dismiss a juror was reversible error if the
complaining party could show that the jury which finally heard the case was
biased or unfair.227
The case next went to the supreme court, which reversed the court of appeals
and the trial court.22 The court held that prejudice is presumed when, as here,
a party is compelled to use peremptory challenges on persons who should have
been excused for cause and the party exercises all of his peremptory challenges
before the court completes the venire.229 The court overruled its decision in
Martinez to the extent that it failed to recognize a presumption of prejudice in
this situation.23
B. Jury Selection-Swearing in of the Jury
In State v. Apodaca,23' the court of appeals considered the permissible time
for swearing in the jury. The state had already presented its opening statement
and its first witness when the defendant moved for a mistrial because the jury
had not been sworn. 232 The trial court denied the motion, gave the oath, and
continued with the trial. 33 Because the oath addresses how the jury will arrive
at a verdict and was administered before the jury began to deliberate, the court
of appeals held that the trial court correctly refused to declare a mistrial.2 3'
C. Right to Public Trial
The court of appeals discussed the right to a public trial, or, more precisely,
the right to a closed trial, in State v. Apodaca.235 In a criminal sexual penetration
case, the prosecutor requested that the courtroom be closed to the public during
the testimony of the child victim.236 The prosecutor requested, however, that the
224. Id. at 700, 736 P.2d at 504. See United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

105 N.M. at 633, 735 P.2d at 1139.
Id.
Id. See State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 445, 623 P.2d 565 (1981).
Fuson, 105 N.M. at 634, 735 P.2d at 1140.
Id.
ld.
105 N.M. 650, 735 P.2d 1156 (Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 654, 735 P.2d at 1160.
Id.

234. Id. N.M.U.J.1. CRIM. 14-123 sets out the oath, which was "do you swear or affirm that you will
arrive at a verdict according to the evidence and the law as contained in the instructions of the court?"

235. 105 N.M. 650, 735 P.2d 1156 (Ct. App. 1987).
236. Id. at 652, 735 P.2d at 1158.
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court permit the victim's family to be present."" The defendant agreed to exclude
the public on the condition that the court permit his family members to be
present."' Over the defendant's objections, the court excluded all spectators,
including the defendant's family.239 The court permitted the victim's family to
remain.' On appeal, the court of appeals noted that once the defendant agreed
to exclude all spectators except his family and the victim's family, the trial court
24
had the discretion to exclude everyone except the victim's family.
D. Jury Instructions-LesserIncluded Offenses
Jury instructions, as always, provided a fertile ground for appellate issues.
242
One of the more notable cases was State v. Boeglin, where the defendant was
prior to submission of
opportunity,
the
had
He
murder.
degree
convicted of first
instructions to the jury, to submit an instruction on the lesser included offense
2
of second degree murder.243 The defendant waived this option. "
whenever the
that
rule
to
On appeal, the defendant urged the supreme court
evidence in a first degree murder prosecution warrants the submission of a second
degree murder instruction, the trial court should give the instruction sua sponte,
regardless of the defendant's wishes.245 The supreme court declined to formulate
such a rule. 2' A defendant is free to make strategic choices, but once he makes
them he generally is bound by them.247
2
In another first degree murder case, State v. Omar-Muhammed, " the defendant
A
appealed his conviction of first degree depraved mind murder. bystander was
killed when the defendant drove through a roadblock at approximately 100 miles
per hour.249 In a case of first impression, the supreme court held that the trial
court erred by refusing to instruct that vehicular homicide, committed while
under the influence of drugs, was a lesser included offense of depraved mind
murder. '
In State v. Boeglin, the supreme court indicated that a defendant is bound by
his strategic choice if he or she declines an instruction which normally would
be given. State v. Omar-Muhammed has the effect of expanding the requirement
that a lesser included offense instruction be given, if the defendant requests it,
in a first degree murder case.
E. Grand Jury Improprieties
In two cases the court of appeals refused to reverse or quash an indictment
for alleged grand jury improprieties. In State v. Apodaca, the prosecutor, while
237. Id.
238. Id.

239. Id.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.

Id. at 654, 735 P.2d at 1160.
105 N.M. 247, 731 P.2d 943 (1987).
ld. at 249, 731 P.2d at 945.
Id.

245. Id.
246. Id.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 251, 731
105 N.M. 788,
Id. at 789, 737
Id. at 792, 737

P.2d at 947. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
737 P.2d 1165 (1987).
P.2d at 1166.
P.2d at 1169.
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conducting a grand jury, excused a regular grand juror and substituted an alternate."' The defendant argued that the alternate was not eligible to serve because
the prosecutor, not the district judge, made the substitution, in violation of state
statute.252 The trial court rejected defendant's argument and the court of appeals
affirmed.253 The court distinguished between mandatory and directory statutory
provisions and held that the statute governing grand jury selection is directory.'
In addition, the court noted that there had been no actual prejudice to the defendant. " 5
In State v. Laskay,256 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to quash an indictment. The defendant alleged that because
the grand jury foreman previously had worked as an assistant district attorney
he was ineligible to serve as a grand juror.25 The court of appeals noted that
qualifications for grand jurors are fixed by statute. " The statute does not provide
for challenges based on individual juror bias or for any cause other than lack of
legal qualifications."
One reason for the court of appeals' affirmance of the grand jury's decision
may be an absence of actual prejudice to the defendant. In Apodoca, the court
noted that the defendant had not shown that he had suffered actual prejudice;
the court felt the prosecutor was attempting to be fair to the defendant. 2" In
Laskay, the court gave a cautionary note: "there could be situations where grand
jurors would be so prejudiced against a person that the jurors would be ineligible
to serve. . ...

261

F. Basis for Mistrial
An important question arises in a jury trial when there is a motion for a mistrial
following improper testimony. The court may resolve this issue by deciding
251. 105 N.M. at 652, 735 P.2d at 1158.
252. Id. at 652-53, 735 P.2d at 1158-59. N.M. STAT. Ann. §31-6-1 (1978) provides, in pertinent part:
"The district judge shall summon and qualify as a panel for grand jury service such number of jurors as
he deems necessary. . . . The district judge may discharge or excuse members of a grand jury and substitute
alternate grand jurors as necessary." Id. Section 31-6-2 provides, in pertinent part: "The foreman, for good
cause, mly request the court to excuse or discharge individual grand jurors and to replace them with alternate
grand jurors as necessary ...."
253. 105 N.M. at 653, 735 P.2d at 1159.
254. Id.
255. Id. "Statutory provisions which relate to the number of and qualifications of jurors, or which are
designed to secure impartiality or freedom from unfair influences, are ordinarily deemed to be mandatory,
while those which prescribe details as to the manner of selection or drawing are usually regarded as
directory." See State v. Gunthorpe, 81 N.M. 515, 469 P.2d 160 (Ct. App. 1970) cert. denied 401 U.S.
941 (1971).
256. 103 N.M. 799, 715 P.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1986).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 800, 715 P.2d at 73. By statute, grounds for challenges to the validity of the grand jury are
limited to: (I) that the grand jury was not legally constituted; (2) that an individual grand juror was not
legally qualified to serve as a juror, and (3) that an individual grand juror was a witness against the person
indicted. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§31-6-3.
260. 105 N.M. at 653, 735 P.2d at 1159.
261. 103 N.M. at 800, 715 P.2d at 73 (quoting State v. Watkins, 92 N.M. 470, 590 P.2d 169 (Ct. App.
1979)).
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2
whether the testimony was solicited. For example, in State v. Nichols, on
direct examination, a key witness for the State made the comment, unsolicited
63
The trial
by the prosecutor, that defendant was acquainted with "inmates."
jury a
the
give
to
offered
and
mistrial
for
motion
defendant's
court denied
cautionary instruction, which defendant declined."' The supreme court upheld
the trial court's decision.265
6
The supreme court reached a different result in State v. Saavedra' where the
67
prosecutor asked the same question at trial and before the grand jury. The
witness gave the same answer each time." On both occasions the prosecutor
asked the state's key witness how long he had known the defendant and both
M
times he answered, "since he got out of the penitentiary."' As in Nichols, this
27
was an improper reference to a defendant's prior felony conviction. Noting
that the answer appeared to be solicited and presuming prosecutorial misconduct,
the court remanded for a new trial.2'
In State v. Hernandez,272 the trial court directed a verdict on a conspiracy
count but permitted the remaining counts to stand and go before the jury.273 The
defendant argued that a mistrial should have been granted because the prejudicial
274
testimony concerning the conspiracy was now before the jury. Defendant's
argument was evaluated by the court of appeals. The court noted that if defendant's reasoning were adopted, a mistrial would have to be granted whenever
5
a trial court decided that one or more charges should not go to the jury. Because
76
affirmed.
was
conviction
defendant's
impractical,
this would be very

VII. SENTENCING
A. Legality of a Sentence
In two cases the court of appeals served notice that a person's sentence is
affected by whether it falls within the provisions of the Criminal Code, the Motor
2
Vehicle Code, or the Worthless Checks Act. In State v. Greyeyes, " defendant
had been sentenced as a repeat driving while intoxicated offender under the
Motor Vehicle Code.278 Under the Motor Vehicle Code, the trial court had the
262. 104 N.M. 74, 717 P.2d 50 (1986).
263. Id.at 75, 717 P.2d at 51.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 103 N.M. 282, 705 P.2d 1133 (1985).
267. Id. at 284, 705 P.2d at 1135.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.at 284-85, 705 P.2d at 1135-36.
272. 104 N.M. 97, 717 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1986).
273. Id.at 99, 717 P.2d at 75.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.at 101, 717 P.2d at 77.
277. 105 N.M. 549, 734 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1987).
278. Id. at 552-53, 734 P.2d at 792-93.
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discretion to give repeat offenders sentences of from ninety days to one year. 279
The trial court sentenced the defendant to one year.2"s
The court of appeals reversed and cited section 31-18-13 of the Criminal
Codeat which provided that whenever a defendant is convicted of a crime not
contained in the Criminal Code, the trial court must set as a definite term of
imprisonment the minimum term prescribed by the statute.28 2 In 1978, the legislature enacted the Criminal Sentencing Act with the intent to replace indeterminate sentencing with determinate sentencing in both Criminal Code cases and
cases not within the Criminal Code.28 3 This is accomplished by requiring imposition of the minimum sentence for all cases. Accordingly, the trial court was
only authorized to give a sentence of ninety days.
In State v. Muzio,"a the defendant was convicted of issuing worthless checks.
Under the Worthless Checks Act this offense had a prescribed penalty of oneto-three years in the penitentiary.2 5 Although issuing worthless checks is a felony,
the trial court erred in treating the offense as a fourth degree felony, which carries
a presumptive sentence of eighteen months. 2 6 The sentence, based upon a statute
not within the Criminal Code, should have been for one year only, which is the
minimum term prescribed by the statute.2 s7
B. Good Time Credit Applied to PretrialCredit
In State v. Aqui,28 s the court addressed the issue of whether a defendant should
be given good time credit for time spent in a county jail. New Mexico's statutory
scheme draws a distinction between the treatment of prisoners detained prior to
sentencing and those confined after sentencing. 289 Good time credit is authorized
only for time served after sentencing.2 9°
After being arrested, defendants were unable to make bail and haid to spend
the time between arrest and sentencing in jail." Before their sentencing hearings,
defendants filed motions for credit for good time spent in jail.292 They argued
279. Id. Defendant was convicted of violating N.M. STAT. ANN. §66-8-102 (Cum. Supp. 1986) of the

Motor Vehicle Code which provided that a conviction for a second or subsequent DWI is punishable by
imprisonment fornot less than ninety days nor more than one year. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §66-8-102(E).
280. 105 N.M. at 550-51, 734 P.2d at 790-91.
281. Id. at 553, 734 P.2d at 793. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
282. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-13(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) provides in pertinent part: "'Whenever a
defendant is convicted of a crime under ...a statute not contained in the Criminal Code, which specifies
the penalty to be imposed on conviction, the court must set as a definite term of imprisonment the minimum
term prescribed by such statute ....1
283. 105 N.M. at 553, 734 P.2d at 793. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) provides
the method for establishing the applicable determinate sentence for offenses not contained in the Criminal
Code.
284. 105 N.M. 352, 732 P.2d 879 (Ct. App. 1987).
285. Id. at 355, 732 P.2d at 882; N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-36-5(B).
286. 105 N.M. at 356, 732 P.2d at 883; N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-15(A)(4) provides that the basic
sentence which may be imposed for a fourth degree felony is eighteen months.
287. 105 N.M. at 356, 732 P.2d at 883.
288. 104 N.M. 345, 721 P.2d 771 (1986).
289. Id. at 349, 721 P.2d at 775.
290. ld.
291. Id.
292. ld. at 347, 721 P.2d at 773.
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that a person on bail prior to sentencing would be able to earn good time credit
for the entire period of his or her incarceration.293 Thus, such a person would
serve a lesser sentence than a person who could not make bail who would be
2
ineligible for good time credit until sentencing. "
The trial court denied defendants' motions, but the court of appeals reversed,
holding that due process required the granting of good time credit for presentence
detainees where it had been earned.295 The supreme court, however, reversed
the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court. 296 It held that New Mexico's
law. 297
statutory scheme did not offend equal protection nor due process of
C. Restitution as a Condition of Sentencing
In State v. Madril,298 the court of appeals held that a direct relationship between
the criminal activities of a defendant and the damages suffered by the victim are
a prerequisite to ordering restitution. 299 The defendant pled nolo contendere to
possession of stolen property. 3" The property in defendant's possession was
returned to the victim." As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered the
3
defendant to pay restitution for unrecovered property taken in the burglary. "
The defendant had not been charged with, nor did she admit to, any elements
of the burglary, however." 3 The court of appeals, finding no relationship between
the defendant and the burglary, held that restitution was not authorized in these
circumstances.'
The court of appeals again found restitution to be unauthorized in State v.
Dean.3 "5 The defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and was sentenced
to incarceration followed by parole. 3"6 One condition of parole was that defendant
make restitution to the State Police for monies used by an undercover State Police
officer to purchase cocaine from the defendant.'" The purpose of the statute
authorizing restitution as a condition of parole is to make recovery possible to
the definition
the victim." The court held that the state was not a victim within
3 9
of the statute and, therefore, restitution was not authorized. "
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 349, 721 P.2d at 775.
Id.
Id. at 346, 721 P.2d at 772.

Id.
Id. at 350-51, 721 P.2d at 776-77.
105 N.M. 396, 733 P.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 397, 733 P.2d at366.
Id.
Id.

302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 398, 733 P.2d at367.
305. 105 N.M. 5, 727 P.2d 944 (Ct. App. 1986).
306. Id. at 8, 727 P.2d at 947.

307. Id.
308. Id. at 9, 727 P.2d at 948; N.M.

STAT. ANN. §31-17-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
actual
309. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-17-1(A)(1) defines a victim as "any person who has suffered
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Actual damages are "damages which a victim
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the same facts or events ... " N.M.
STAT. ANN. §31-17-1(A)(2). The court concluded that, because the state is not a "victim", compensating
the state does not further the purpose of victim restitution.
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In State v. Muzio,3" ° the court of appeals reviewed what effect a defendant's
filing for, or discharge in, bankruptcy should have on an order of restitution.
The court held that such a filing or discharge does not void a restitution order
imposed as a condition of probation under a state criminal judgment. "
The court of appeals discussed a probationer's ability or inability to pay a fine
in State v. Parsons."2 The defendant failed to pay a fine as required by probation."' The trial court automatically revoked probation" 4 once the violation was
established.3"5 The defendant had testified he was financially unable to make
additional payments." 6 The court of appeals held that the trial court could revoke
probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment if he willfully refused to
pay.3" 7 If the defendant could not pay despite bona fide efforts, the court must'
consider alternate methods of punishment. 3 8 Furthermore, the trial court must
indicate in the record, or adopt findings of fact, which state whether defendant
had the ability to pay and whether defendant's failure to pay was willful.3" 9 The
court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for entry of additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law.32 °
D. Sentencing an Habitual Offender
"
The issue in State v. Marquez32
' and State v. Davis322 was when can a conviction
be used for habitual offender purposes. In State v. Marquez, the court held that
a conviction resulting from a plea of nolo contendere may be used to enhance
a defendant's sentence as an habitual offender.323 The defendant argued that
Evidence Rule 410 prohibits admission of a plea of nolo contendere in any civil
or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea. 324 The court noted
that the fact that defendant pled nolo contendere was not being used against him;
it was, rather, the fact that there was a conviction following that plea that was
being used. 32
In a similar challenge, in State v. Davis, the defendant was convicted of a
felony and given a deferred sentence.32 6 He subsequently was given additional
years as an habitual offender.32 The supreme court held that it was permissible
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
$15.00
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

105 N.M. at 355, 732 P.2d at 879.
Id.
104 N.M. 123,717 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 124-25, 717 P.2d at 100-01.
Id. at 125, 717 P.2d at 101. The fine was for $500. In addition, there were probation costs of
a month.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126, 717 P.2d at 307.
Id.
Id. at 126-27, 717 P.2d at 102-03.
Id. at 127, 717 P.2d at 103.
105 N.M. 269, 731 P.2d 965 (Ct. App. 1987).
104 N.M. 229, 719 P.2d 807 (1986).
105 N.M. at 272, 731 P.2d at 968.
Id. at 270, 731 P.2d at 966.
Id.
104 N.M. at 229, 719 P.2d at 807.
Id.
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to enhance a deferred sentence in a subsequent habitual offender proceeding.32
provided for enhancement of
The court noted that the Habitual Offender Act ...
the basic sentence for "any person convicted . . ." and that conviction, not the
sentence imposed, is the polestar for analysis." °
E. The Habitual Offender and Consecutive Sentencing
The court of appeals considered the issue of consecutive enhancements for
habitual offenders convicted of multiple offenses in State v. Lucero."' The defendant had been convicted of three fourth degree felonies for which his sentence
totaled four and one-half years.332 All three convictions were enhanced by eight
years under the Habitual Offender Act, to run consecutively for an additional
twenty-four years.333 The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, which carried
a total of twenty-eight and one-half years.334 In doing so, the court observed that
the length of a sentence is a legislative perogative which the court will not disturb
without a compelling reason.335
F. The Paroleeand Consecutive Sentencing
The New Mexico courts took a different approach to consecutive sentences
in the area of parole. In Brock v. Sullivan,33 the defendant was convicted of
four fourth degree felonies and was sentenced to incarceration, where the sentences were to be served consecutively.337 The Parole Board held that defendant
must serve one year of parole for each offense; thus, the defendant was subject
to four years of parole.33
The supreme court reversed the Parole Board. 339 The court held that in the
case of consecutive sentencing, the parole of each offense commences immediately after the period of imprisonment for that offense.' The parole time runs
concurrently with the running of any subsequent basic sentence then being
served. 34 '
G. Effective Date of Sentencing for Habitual Offender Purposes
In State v. Castillo, 4 2 the defendant pled guilty to a first offense.343 He then
committed a second offense before the court filed the Judgment and Sentence in
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at 230, 719 P.2d at 808.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
Id.
104 N.M. 587, 725 P.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 594, 725 P.2d at 273.
Id.
Id.
Id.
105 N.M. 412, 733 P.2d 860 (1987).
Id. at 413, 733 P.2d at 861.
Id. at 413-14, 733 P.2d at 861-62.
Id. at 415, 733 P.2d at 863.
Id. at 414-15, 733 P.2d at 862-63.
Id.
105 N.M. 623, 735 P.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1987).
ld. at 624, 735 P.2d at 541.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

the first case. ' The defendant was convicted of the second offense. 45 The court
subsequently took both offenses into account and tried and sentenced the defendant as an habitual offender.'
The defendant argued that the trial court erred in considering the first offense
for habitual offender purposes because the guilty plea for that offense had not
been reduced to writing when the subsequent offense occurred. 7 The court of
appeals, however, could see no reason why a person who is given the opportunity
to remain free pending sentencing, but who commits another crime prior to
sentencing, should be protected from a law designed to deter the subsequent
crime.' The appellate court, affirming the trial court, also noted that a plea of
guilty constituted a legal conviction within the meaning of the habitual offender
statute."
H. Sentencing for Contempt of Court
In State v. Pothier,3so the supreme court took a direct role in sentencing for
contempt of court. There is no constitutional or statutory limit on a sentence of
"
criminal contempt of court in New Mexico. 35
' The only limit on such a sentence
3
52
lies in the district court's discretion. In Pothier,two co-defendants were given
a life sentence for contempt following a jury trial.353 The supreme court noted,
after reviewing decisions in other jurisdictions, that no state has a statutory
imprisonment for contempt of court of longer than one year. 3 Thus, the supreme
court remanded for new sentencing.355 Similarly, in Case v. State,356 the supreme
court found that a ten year sentence for one count of criminal contempt was
excessive and was an abuse of discretion by the trial court.35 7
The court of appeals reversed another conviction for contempt which involved
an excessive fine. 358 The trial judge found counsel in direct criminal contempt
for counsel's behavior and for his refusal to answer questions the court put to
him.35 9 Because counsel's refusal to answer in the presence of the court constituted direct contempt, the court was able to impose a penalty in a summary
proceeding.' The court imposed a fine of $10,000.36' The court of appeals found
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. 104 N.M. 363, 721 P.2d 1294 (1986).
351. Id. at 369, 721 P.2d at 1300.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 364, 721 P.2d at 1295. Defendants were convicted pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. §34-1-2
(Repl. Pamp. 1981), which authorizes the court "to punish contempts by reprimand, arrest, fine or imprisonment ......
354. 104 N.M. at 370, 721 P.2d at 1301.
355. Id.
356. 103 N.M. 501, 709 P.2d 670 (1985).

357. Id. at 503, 709 P.2d at 672.
358. In re Summary Contempt Proceedings Against Michael Tom Cherryhomes, 103 N.M. 771, 714
P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1985).

359. Id. at 774, 714 P.2d at 191.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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2
that a fine in excess of $1,000 gave the defendant the right to a jury trial. The
court remanded the case, In re Summary Contempt Proceedings againstMichael
363
Tom Cherryhomes, for a trial by jury on the contempt issue.

362. Id. See Seven Rivers Farm, Inc. v. Reynolds, 84 N.M. 789, 508 P.2d 1276 (1973), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 103 N.M. 430, 708 P.2d 1031 (1985).

363. 103 N.M. at 775, 714 P.2d at 192.

